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Abstract
A probabilistic framework is developed that gives a unifying perspective on both the
classical and the quantum games. We suggest exploiting peculiar probabilities involved in
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments to construct quantum games. In our frame-
work a game attains classical interpretation when joint probabilities are factorizable and a
quantum game corresponds when these probabilities cannot be factorized. We analyze how
non-factorizability changes Nash equilibria in two-player games while considering the games
of Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Chicken. In this framework we find that for the game
of Prisoner’s Dilemma even non-factorizable EPR joint probabilities cannot be helpful to es-
cape from the classical outcome of the game. For a particular version of the Chicken game,
however, we find that the two non-factorizable sets of joint probabilities, that maximally
violates the Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne (CHSH) sum of correlations, indeed result in new
Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
Usual approach in the area of quantum games [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] consists of analyzing a
quantum system manoeuvred by participating agents, recognized as players, who possess necessary
means for their actions on parts of the system. The quantum system evolves to its final state
and players’ payoffs, or utilities, mathematically expressed as expectation values of self-adjoint
payoff operators, are generated from quantum measurement [10]. Thus the usual constructions
of quantum games involve the concepts of quantum state vectors, entangled states, quantum
measurement, expectation values, trace operation, and that of density operators etc. This may
seem normal because as being part of the research field of quantum computation [11] quantum
games are expected to exploit relevant tools from quantum mechanics. However, in our experience,
this noticeable reliance of the models of quantum games on the tools of quantum mechanics also
succeeds to keep many readers away from this inter-disciplinary area of research. Ideally, they
would like to see genuine quantum games constructed from elementary probabilistic concepts, as
it is the case with many examples in game theory [12]. We find this situation as an opportunity
to present a probabilistic approach in which quantum games are constructed without referring to
the tools of quantum mechanics.
While looking for the possibility of such an approach, it is encouraging to find that the most
unusual character of quantum mechanics can be expressed in terms of probabilities [13] only.
For example, Bell inequalities [14, 15, 16, 10] can be written in terms of constraints on joint
probabilities relevant to pairs of certain random variables. As probabilities are central to usual
analyses in game theory, it seems natural to use the peculiar probabilities, responsible for the
violation of Bell inequalities, to construct quantum games. We, therefore, suggest to construct
quantum games from the probabilities arising in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments
[17, 14, 16, 18, 10] performed to test the violation of Bell inequalities. The most unusual character
of the EPR probabilities, that they may not be factorizable, motivates us, in this paper, to find
how non-factorizability can be used to construct quantum games. In other words, we search for the
role of non-factorizable probabilities in game-theoretic solution concepts when EPR experiments
provide the sets of non-factorizable probabilities.
This explicitly probabilistic approach towards quantum games is expected to be of interest to
the readers from such areas as economics [19] and mathematical biology [20], where game theory
finds extensive applications and the tools of quantum mechanics are found to be rather alien.
Secondly, because of its exclusively probabilistic content, this approach promises to provide a
unified perspective for both the classical and the quantum games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the role of factorizability in
deriving Bell inequality. Section 3 discusses playing two-player games using factorizable probabil-
ities and presents two- and four-coin setups to play the well known games of Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD), Stag Hunt (SH), and Chicken [12]. Section 4 describes playing two-player games with EPR
experiments. Section 5 develops a framework in which factorizable probabilities lead to the clas-
sical game whereas non-factorizable probabilities result in the quantum game. Section 6 discusses
the results and presents a view for further work.
2 Factorizability and violation of Bell inequality
Factorizability is known to be an interesting property of coupled systems with separated parts,
saying [21] that for such systems the probability for a simultaneous pair of outcomes can be
expressed as the product of the probability for each outcome separately. Mathematically, this is
expressed by writing joint probabilities as arithmetic product of their respective marginals [22].
It turns out to be the most important technical ingredient in the proof of Bell inequality. In fact,
J. S. Bell used factorizability in his mathematical formulation of locality [10]. Others [21, 23, 22]
have recognized it, for example, by such terms as “conditional stochastic dependence.”
We describe factorizability with reference to the standard EPR setup [18, 10] used to derive
Bell inequality. This setup consists of two spatially-separated participants, known as Alice and
Bob, who share two-particle systems emitted by the same source. We specify the state of a coupled
system by λ. We denote Alice’s parameter by a that can be set either at S1 or at S2 and denote
Bob’s parameter by b that can be set either at S′1 or at S
′
2.
In a run, Alice sets her apparatus either at S1 or at S2 and, in either case, on receiving her
particle she makes a measurement, the outcome of which is πA that is either +1 or −1. In the
same run, Bob sets his apparatus either at S
′
1 or at S
′
2 and, in either case, on receiving his particle
he makes a measurement, the outcome of which is πB that can be either +1 or −1. Alice and Bob
record the outcomes of their measurements for many runs as they receive two-particle systems
emitted from the same source.
We denote the probability that Alice obtains the outcome πA = +1 or −1 by Pr(λ;πA, a) and,
similarly, we denote the probability that Bob obtains the outcome πB = +1 or −1 by Pr(λ;πB; b).
Also, we denote the probability that Alice and Bob obtain the outcomes πA and πB, respectively,
by Pr(λ;πA, πB; a, b). These outcomes result from their choices of the parameters a and b, i.e.
which one of the four pairs (S1, S
′
1), (S1, S
′
2), (S2, S
′
1), (S2, S
′
2) is realized in a run.
According to quantum theory, the outcomes πA and πB both are completely random and Alice
and Bob can only find the probabilities to obtain +1 or −1 at the outcomes of their measurements.
As it is described in the Section 4, Alice’s and Bob’s parameters a and b decide these probabilities.
In many runs, Alice can choose between S1 or S2 with some probability. Similarly, in many
runs, Bob can choose between S′1 or S
′
2 with some probability.
Assume that the source emits a total of N two-particle systems. We denote by N(πA; a) the
number of times Alice gets the outcome πA when she may set her parameter a either at S1 or
at S2. Similarly, we denote by N(πB; b) the number of times Bob gets the outcome πB when he
may set his parameter b either at S′1 or at S
′
2. And, we denote by N(πA, πB; a, b) the number of
times when Alice gets the outcome πA and Bob gets the outcome πB, wherever they may set their
parameters a and b, respectively. When N is large, the ensemble probabilities are defined as
Pr(πA; a) = N(πA; a)/N, Pr(πA; b) = N(πB; b)/N,
Pr(πA, πB; a, b) = N(πA, πB; a, b)/N.
(1)
For many runs we consider an ensemble of states emitted from the source that may not be the
same. To allow mixture of states we denote the normalized probability density, characterizing the
ensemble of emissions, by ρ(λ). The ensemble probabilities are
Pr(πA; a) =
∫
Γ ρ(λ) Pr(λ;πA; a)dλ,
Pr(πB; b) =
∫
Γ
ρ(λ) Pr(λ;πB; b)dλ,
Pr(πA, πB; a, b) =
∫
Γ ρ(λ) Pr(λ;πA, πB; a, b)dλ,
(2)
where Γ is the space of states λ. Now, factorizability states that
Pr(λ;πA, πB ; a, b) = Pr(λ;πA; a) Pr(λ;πB; b). (3)
That is, for each λ the joint probabilities are arithmetic product of their respective marginals.
Factorizability being the most important technical ingredient in the proof of Bell inequality
can be seen as follows. Following inequalities must hold when probabilities are sensible quantities
0 ≤ Pr(λ;πA; a) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Pr(λ;πB; b) ≤ 1. (4)
We now refer to a theorem stating that if six numbers ω1, ω2, ̟1, ̟2, ς1, ς2 are given such that
0 ≤ ω1 ≤ ς1, 0 ≤ ω2 ≤ ς1, 0 ≤ ̟1 ≤ ς2, 0 ≤ ̟2 ≤ ς2, (5)
then the function Ξ = ω1̟1−ω1̟2+ω2̟1+ω2̟2−ς2ω2−ς1̟1 is constrained by the inequalities
− ς1ς2 ≤ Ξ ≤ 0. (6)
Proof of this theorem can, for example, be found in Ref. [25]. Inequalities (4) together with the
inequalities (6) give
−1 ≤ Pr(λ;πA;S1) Pr(λ;πB;S′1)− Pr(λ;πA;S1) Pr(λ;πB;S′2)+
Pr(λ;πA;S2) Pr(λ;πB;S
′
1) + Pr(λ;πA;S2) Pr(λ;πB;S
′
2)−
Pr(λ;πB;S2)− Pr(λ;πB;S′1) ≤ 0,
(7)
for each λ. The central role of factorizability follows as when the definition (3) of factorizability
holds, the multiplication of (7) by ρ(λ) and the subsequent integration over λ gives
−1 ≤ Pr(πA, πB;S1, S′1)− Pr(πA, πB;S1, S′2) + Pr(πA, πB;S2, S′1)+
Pr(πA, πB;S2, S
′
2)− Pr(πA;S2)− Pr(πB;S′1) ≤ 0, (8)
which is the Bell (or Clauser-Horne) inequality [25]. Note that the definition (3) is crucial in order
to obtain the inequality (8).
3 Two-player games using factorizable probabilities
To bring non-factorizability into the realm of two-player games, we consider a symmetric two-
player, two-strategy, non-cooperative game [12] represented by the matrices
A = Alice X1
X2
Bob
X ′1 X
′
2(
K L
M N
)
, B = Alice X1
X2
Bob
X ′1 X
′
2(
K M
L N
)
, (9)
where all K,L,M,N are real numbers. Players can go for one of the two available strategies: X1,
X2 for Alice and X
′
1, X
′
2 for Bob.
As factorizability is central to obtain Bell inequality, in this paper we construct quantum games
from non-factorizable probabilities that exploit EPR setup. This rests on Fine’s view [21] that the
violation of Bell inequality in EPR experiments shows that quantum theory violates factorizability.
This view allows us to construct quantum games for which factorizability always corresponds to
the classical game.
We recognize key features of an EPR setup being that these relate to a probabilistic system
divided into two parts such that a) each observer has access to one part of the system b) each
observer can select between two available choices c) observers cannot communicate between them-
selves d) observers can make independent selections between the available choices e) probabilities
relevant to each part of the system are normalized1 and that f) probabilities are sensible quantities.
It is worth mentioning here that the experimental testing of Bell inequality involves four
correlation experiments that correspond to combining S1 with S
′
1, S1 with S
′
2, S2 with S
′
1, and S2
with S′2, respectively. These experiments are mutually exclusive in the sense that for any given
experiment Alice has to select between S1 and S2 and Bob has to select between S
′
1 and S
′
2.
That is, Alice (Bob) cannot go for S1 (S
′
1) and S2 (S
′
2) simultaneously because the corresponding
observables are incompatible, and cannot be measured simultaneously. Whereas, in the above
derivation of the Bell inequality it is assumed that S1, S
′
1, S2, S
′
2 all have definite values which can
be measured simultaneously in pairs.
3.1 Games with coins
The above mentioned features are remindful of coins which, if distributed between players, are
found to have all the above mentioned properties. For coins factorizability has a straightforward
meaning in that the associated probabilities remain factorizable. Hence, we develop an analysis
of two-player games with non-factorizable probabilities by first translating playing of three well
known games in terms of the games played when players share coins. It turns out that a version
1Its exact meaning will be described shortly.
of this translation provides the right comparison with the probabilities involved in the EPR ex-
periments and opens the way to the next step i.e. to introduce non-factorizable probabilities into
the playing of two-player games.
3.1.1 Two-coin setup
We now consider pairs of coins and use it to play a two-player game (9). For example, this game
can be played when each player receives a coin, head up, and ‘to flip’ or to ‘not to flip’ is a player’s
strategy. Both coins are then passed to a referee who rewards the players after observing the state
of both coins.
Assume S1 (to flip) and S2 (not to flip) are Alice’s strategies and S
′
1 (to flip) and S
′
2 (not to
flip) are Bob’s strategies. That is, with reference to the matrices (9), we make the association
S1 ∼ X1, S2 ∼ X2, and S′1 ∼ X ′1, S′1 ∼ X ′1. In two-coin setup, we assume that the strategies S1
and S′1 represent Alice’s and Bob’s actions ‘to flip’ the coin, respectively; and, similarly, S2 and
S′2 represent Alice’s and Bob’s actions ‘not to flip’ the coin, respectively.
In repeated runs of the game players can play mixed strategies. Alice’s mixed strategy x
∈ [0, 1] is the probability to choose S1 over S2 and similarly Bob’s mixed strategy y ∈ [0, 1] is the
probability to choose S′1 over S
′
2. Players’ payoffs are written as
ΠA,B(x, y) =
(
x
1− x
)T (
(K,K) (L,M)
(M,L) (N,N)
)(
y
1− y
)
, (10)
where T is for transpose and the subscripts A and B refer to Alice and Bob, respectively. The
first and the second entries in a parentheses are Alice’s and Bob’s payoffs, respectively. Assume
(x⋆, y⋆) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) [12]:
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) > 0, ΠB(x⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) > 0. (11)
In rest of this paper we will use “NE” when we refer to either a Nash equilibrium or to Nash
equilibria, assuming that the right meaning can be judged from the context. We identify this
arrangement to play a two-player game using two coins as the two-coin setup.
3.1.2 Four-coin setup
The game (9) can also be played using four coins instead of two. It is arranged by assigning two
coins to each player before the game is played. In a run each player has to choose one coin. Two
coins out of four are, therefore, chosen by the players in each turn. These coins are then passed
to a referee who tosses them together and observes the outcome. It is assumed that the players
do not need to share fair coins.
We recall that in two-coin setup S1 and S
′
1 are Alice’s and Bob’s strategies, respectively, that
represent players’ actions ‘to flip’ the coin that a player receives in a turn. Instead of flipping or
not flipping, in four-coin setup a player’s strategy is to choose one out of the two coins that are
made available to each player in a turn. The four-coin setup is relevant as, in a run, choosing a
coin out of the two corresponds to choosing one of the two directions in which measurement is
performed in standard EPR experiment, the outcome of which is +1 or −1.
In repeated game, a player’s strategy is defined by the selection she/he makes over several runs
of the game. For example, a player plays a pure strategy when she/he goes for the same coin over
all the runs and plays a mixed strategy when she/he finds a probability to choose one coin out of
the two over many runs. Referee rewards the players according to their strategies, the underlying
statistics of four coins obtained from the outcomes of many tosses each one of which follows every
time the two players choose two out of the total four coins, and the matrices (9) representing the
game being played.
We identify the arrangement using four coins to play a two-player game as the four-coin setup.
Note that in four-coin setup the players’ rewards depend on the outcomes of repeated tosses even
for pure strategies. A large number of runs are, therefore, necessary whether a player plays a
pure-strategy or a mixed-strategy. Four-coin setup provides an inherently probabilistic character
to playing a two-player game and facilitates a probabilistic analysis when we seek to play the game
(9) using EPR experiments.
As the four-coin setup uses a different definition of a strategy relative to the two-coin setup,
we call S1 and S2 being Alice’s coins and S
′
1 and S
′
2 being Bob’s coins. When selecting a coin is
a player’s strategy and we want to play the game given by the matrices (9), it is reasonable to
make the association S1 ∼ X1, S2 ∼ X2, and S′1 ∼ X ′1, S′1 ∼ X ′1.
We represent the head of a coin by +1 and its tail by −1 and adapt this convention in the rest
of this paper. For coins, Alice’s outcome of πA = +1 or −1 (whether she goes for S1 or S2) is
independent from Bob’s outcome of πB = +1 or −1 (whether he goes for S′1 or S′2) and relevant
joint probabilities are factorizable.
Referring to the definition (3) of factorizability and noticing that probabilities associated to
coins are factorizable, we use the same notation that is introduced in Section 2 to consider, for
example, the probability Pr(πA, πB;S1, S
′
1) that can be factorized as Pr(πA;S1) Pr(πB;S
′
1).
We define probabilities r, r′ ∈ [0, 1] by r = Pr(+1;S1) and r′ = Pr(+1;S′1) saying that r is
the probability of getting head for Alice’s first coin S1 and r
′ is the probability of getting head
for Bob’s first coin S′1. Factorizability then allows us to write Pr(+1,−1;S1, S′1) = r(1 − r′) and
Pr(−1,−1;S2, S′2) = (1 − s)(1 − s′) where s = Pr(+1;S2) and s′ = Pr(+1;S′2) i.e. s and s′ are
the probabilities of getting head for Alice’s and Bob’s second coin, respectively.
In four-coin setup we find it useful to have the following table:
Alice
Bob
S1
+1
−1
S′1
+1 −1
rr′ r(1 − r′)
r′(1 − r) (1− r)(1 − r′)
S′2
+1 −1
rs′ r(1 − s′)
s′(1− r) (1− r)(1 − s′)
S2
+1
−1
sr′ s(1− r′)
r′(1− s) (1− s)(1− r′)
ss′ s(1− s′)
s′(1− s) (1− s)(1 − s′)
(12)
from which we define payoff relations for the players:
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1) = r¸
T (A,B)r¸′, ΠA,B(S1, S′2) = r¸T (A,B)s¸′,
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1) = s¸
T (A,B)r¸′, ΠA,B(S2, S′2) = s¸T (A,B)s¸′, (13)
where
r¸ =
(
r
1− r
)
, s¸ =
(
s
1− s
)
, r¸′ =
(
r′
1− r′
)
, s¸′ =
(
s′
1− s′
)
. (14)
For example, ΠA(S1, S
′
2) is Alice’s payoff when, in repeated runs of coin tossing, she always goes
for her first coin, i.e. S1, while Bob goes for his second coin, i.e. S
′
2.
As it is the case with two-coin setup, Alice’s mixed strategy in four-coin setup is the probability
with which she chooses her pure strategy2 S1 over her other pure strategy S2 during repeated runs
of the experiment. Similarly, Bob’s mixed strategy is the probability with which he chooses his
pure strategy S′1 over his other pure strategy S
′
2 during repeated runs of the experiment. Assume
that Alice plays S1 with probability x and Bob plays S
′
1 with probability y, their mixed-strategy
payoff relations are
ΠA,B(x, y) =
(
x
1− x
)T (
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1) ΠA,B(S1, S
′
2)
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1) ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2)
)(
y
1− y
)
. (15)
The NE can then be found from (11), which is written as
2Notice that our definition of a pure strategy corresponds to the usual mixed-strategy. This agrees with the
result in quantum games that a product pure state corresponds to a mixed-strategy classical game.
(r¸ − s¸)TA{y⋆(r¸′ − s¸′)+s¸′} (x⋆ − x) > 0,{
x⋆(r¸ − s¸)T + s¸T}B(r¸′−s¸′)(y⋆ − y) > 0. (16)
In the following, before we make a transition to playing our game using EPR experiments, we
consider playing three well known games using both the two- and the four-coin setups.
3.2 Examples
We analyze the games of PD, SH, and Chicken in two- and four-coin setups and afterwards make
a transition to the EPR setup. PD is known to be a representative of the problems of social
cooperation [12] and has been one of the earliest [2] and favorite topics for quantum games. Hence
it is worthwhile to analyze this game in the setup using non-factorizable probabilities. Our second
game is SH that, like PD, describes conflict between safety and social cooperation. Our third game
is Chicken, also known as the Hawk-Dove game [12], which is considered an influential model of
conflict for two players in game theory.
3.2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
PD is a noncooperative game [12] that is widely known to economists, social and political scientists,
and in recent years to quantum physicists. It is one of the earliest games to be investigated in
the quantum regime [2]. Its name comes from the following situation: two criminals are arrested
after having committed a crime together. Each suspect is placed in a separate cell and may
choose between two strategies: to confess (D) and not to confess (C), where C and D stand for
Cooperation and Defection.
If neither suspect confesses, i.e. (C,C), they go free, which is represented by K units of payoff
for each suspect. When one prisoner confesses (D) and the other does not (C), the prisoner who
confesses getsM units of payoff, which represents freedom as well as financial reward i.e. M > K,
while the prisoner who did not confess gets L, represented by his ending up in the prison. When
both prisoners confess, i.e. (D,D), both are given a reduced term represented by N units of
payoff, where N > L, but it is not so good as going free i.e. K > N .
Referring to the matrices (9) we make the association X1, X
′
1 ∼ C and X2, X ′2 ∼ D and require
thatM > K > N > L. We define △1 = (M −K), △2 = (N −L), △3 = (△2−△1) which requires
△1,△2 > 0 for this game. In two-coin setup, the inequalities (11) give
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (y⋆△3 −△2)(x⋆ − x) > 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (x⋆△3 −△2)(y⋆ − y) > 0, (17)
and (x⋆, y⋆) = (0, 0) comes out as a unique NE at which players’ payoffs are ΠA(S1, S
′
1) = N =
ΠB(S1, S
′
1).
In the four-coin setup, the PD game as defined above is played as follows. Using the mixed-
strategy payoff relation (15), the pair of pure strategies (S2, S
′
2) is represented by (x
⋆, y⋆) = (0, 0).
If we require this strategy pair to be a NE then we also need to know about the constraints this
requirement imposes on r, s, r′, s′. When (x⋆, y⋆) = (0, 0) the NE inequalities (16) for PD are
reduced to
−x(s− r)△2 {(△1/△2 − 1) s+ 1} > 0,
−y(s′ − r′)△2 {(△1/△2 − 1) s′ + 1} > 0. (18)
Now, for the NE inequalities (18) to hold, it is required that (s − r) ≤ 0 and (s′ − r′) ≤ 0 both
when △1/△2 ≥ 1 and when △1/△2 < 1. This, of course, is possible if
Pr{S2(+1)} = s = 0 = s′ = Pr{S′2(+1)}, (19)
which must hold if the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (0, 0) is to be a NE in PD. Eqs. (19) should be
true along with that the probabilities Pr(πA, πB; a, b) are factorizable. As we find it, this result
provides the basis on which the forthcoming argument for the quantum version of this game rests.
Notice that, from (13), we obtain ΠA(S2, S
′
2) = ΠB(S2, S
′
2) = N when Eq. (19) holds.
The constraint (19) appears when the strategy pair (S2, S
′
2) is assumed to be the NE. One can
assume other strategy pair, for example (S1, S
′
1), to be a NE for which, instead of the requirement
(19), we obtain
Pr{S1(+1)} = r = 0 = r′ = Pr{S′1(+1)}. (20)
However, it is found that this freedom does not affect the forthcoming argument for a quantum
game.
3.2.2 Stag Hunt
Along with PD, the game of SH provides another interesting context to study problems of social
cooperation. It describes the situation when two hunters can either jointly hunt a stag (an adult
deer that makes a large meal) or individually hunt a rabbit (which is tasty but makes substantially
small meal). Hunting a stag is quite challenging and hunters need to cooperate with each other,
especially, it is quite unlikely that a hunter hunts a stag alone.
It is found that, in contrast to PD that has a single pure NE, the game of SH has three NE,
two of which are pure and one is mixed. The two pure NE correspond to the situations when both
hunters hunt the stag as a team and when each hunts rabbit by himself. SH differs from PD in
that mutual cooperation gives maximum reward to the hunters. When compared to PD, SH is
considered a better model for the problems of (social) cooperation.
Referring to the matrices (9) the game of SH is defined by
K > M ≥ N > L and M +N > K + L. (21)
In two-coin setup the NE inequalities for this game remain the same as the inequalities (17) except
that now we have
△3 > △2 > 0 and 0 > △1, (22)
instead of the condition △1,△2 > 0 that hold for PD. Here △1,△2,△3 are defined in the Section
3.2.1. This leads to three NE:
(x⋆, y⋆)1 = (0, 0);
(x⋆, y⋆)2 = (△2/△3,△2/△3);
(x⋆, y⋆)3 = (1, 1);
(23)
and the corresponding payoffs at these equilibria, obtained from Eqs. (10), are
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)1 = N = ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)1;
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)2 = (△2/△3)2△3 + (△2/△3)△4 +N = ΠB(x⋆, y⋆)2;
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)3 = K = ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)3;
(24)
where we define △4 = L+M − 2N .
Now consider playing this game within the four-coin setup in which the NE inequalities (16)
reduce to
(r − s)[y⋆(r′ − s′)△3 + (s′△3 −△2)](x⋆ − x) ≥ 0,
(r′ − s′)[x⋆(r − s)△3 + (s△3 −△2)](y⋆ − y) ≥ 0. (25)
From the inequalities (25) the NE (x⋆, y⋆)1 = (0, 0) results when
s = 0 = s′ (26)
and, similarly, the NE (x⋆, y⋆)3 = (1, 1) results when
r = 0 = r′. (27)
Also, the inequalities (25) hold when x⋆ = (s△3 −△2)/(s− r)△3, y⋆ = (s′△3 −△2)/(s′ − r′)△3
and for (x⋆, y⋆)2 = (△2/△3,△2/△3) to be a NE we require
s = 0, r = 1 and s′ = 0, r′ = 1. (28)
These constraints on r, s, r′, s′ hold along with the probabilities Pr(πA, πB; a, b) being factorizable.
3.2.3 Chicken game
The game of Chicken is about two drivers who drive towards each other from opposite directions.
One driver must turn aside, or both may die in a crash. If one driver turns aside but the other does
not, s/he will be called a “chicken”. While each driver prefers not to yield to the opponent, the
outcome where neither driver yields is the worst possible one for both. In this anti-coordination
game it is mutually beneficial for parties to play different strategies.
Sometimes, Chicken is also known as the “Hawk-Dove” game, that originates from the parallel
development of the basic principles of this game in two different research areas: economics and
mathematical biology. Economists, and the political scientists too, refer to [19] this game as
Chicken, while mathematical biologists refer to [20] it as the Hawk-Dove game.
The game of Chicken differs from PD in that in Chicken the mutual defection (the crash when
both players drive straight) is the most feared outcome. While in PD cooperation while the other
player defects is the worst outcome.
A version of the Chicken game is obtained from the matrices (9) when
K = 0, L = α, M = β, N = 0, 0 < α < (α+ β). (29)
Playing this game in two-coin setup the inequalities (11) are reduced to
{α− y⋆(α+ β)} (x⋆ − x) ≥ 0, {α− x⋆(α+ β)} (y⋆ − y) ≥ 0, (30)
and three NE emerge:
(x⋆, y⋆)1 = (1, 0);
(x⋆, y⋆)2 = (α/(α+ β), α/(α+ β));
(x⋆, y⋆)3 = (0, 1).
(31)
The corresponding payoffs at these equilibria, obtained from Eqs. (10), are
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)1 = α, ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)1 = β;
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)2 = αβ/(α+ β) = ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)2;
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)3 = β, ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)3 = α.
(32)
Now we play this game using the four-coin setup. The NE inequalities come out to be the
same as the ones given in (25) except that now we have △3 = −(α+ β) and △2 = −α. Then for
(x⋆, y⋆)1 = (1, 0) we require
r = 0 and s′ = 0. (33)
Similarly, for (x⋆, y⋆)3 = (0, 1) we require
r′ = 0 and s = 0. (34)
At (x⋆, y⋆)2 = (α/(α+ β), α/(α+ β)) the inequalities (25) reduce to
(r − s)(α− αr′ − βs′)(α/(α+ β)− x) ≥ 0, (r′ − s′)(α− αr − βs)(α/(α+ β)− y) ≥ 0, (35)
which puts constraint on r, s, r′, s′ given as
α(1− r′) = βs′, α(1− r) = βs. (36)
A special case is the one when α = β and the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (1/2, 1/2) becomes a NE
which imposes certain constraints on r, s, r′, s′. For this NE the inequalities (16), for the game
defined by (9, 29), are reduced to
(r − s) {−(α+ β)(r′ + s′)/2 + L} (1/2− x) > 0,
(r′ − s′) {−(α+ β)(r + s)/2 + L} (1/2− y) > 0, (37)
so, we require
r + s = 1 = r′ + s′, (38)
if the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (1/2, 1/2) is to be a NE in this game. Along with this, the
probabilities Pr(πA, πB; a, b) are to be factorizable.
4 Playing games with EPR experiments
Section 3 describes playing a two-player game with four coins such that choosing a coin is a
strategy while players’ payoffs are given by their strategies, the matrix of the game, and the
underlying statistics of the coins. This facilitates transition to playing the same game using EPR
experiments.
In EPR setup, Alice and Bob are spatially separated and are unable to communicate with each
other. In an individual run, both receive one half of a pair of particles originating from a common
source. In the same run of the experiment both choose one from two given (pure) strategies.
These strategies are the two directions in space along which spin or polarization measurements
can be made.
Keeping the notation for the coins, we denote these directions to be S1, S2 for Alice and S
′
1, S
′
2
for Bob. Each measurement generates +1 or −1 as the outcome, like it is the case with coins after
their toss in the four-coin setup. Experimental results are recorded for a large number of individual
runs of the experiment and payoffs are awarded depending on the directions the players go for
over many runs (defining their strategies), the matrix of the game they play, and the statistics of
the measurement outcomes.
For EPR experiments, we retain Cereceda’ notation [26] for the associated probabilities:
pk = Pr(πA, πB; a, b) with k = 1 +
(1 − πB)
2
+ 2
(1− πA)
2
+ 4(b− 1) + 8(a− 1). (39)
In this notation, for example, we write p1 for the probability Pr(+1,+1;S1, S
′
1) and p8 for the
probability Pr(−1,−1;S1, S′2). One can then construct the following table of probabilities
Alice
S1
+1
−1
S2
+1
−1
Bob
S′1
+1 −1
S′2
+1 −1
p1 p2
p3 p4
p5 p6
p7 p8
p9 p10
p11 p12
p13 p14
p15 p16
. (40)
This table allows to transparently see how the probabilities pi(1 ≤ i ≤ 16) are linked to the
probabilities Pr(πA, πB; a, b), where we recall that a can be set at S1 or at S2 and, similarly, b
can be set at S2 or at S
′
2. In Cereceda’s notation the EPR probabilities pi are normalized as they
satisfy the following relations
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1,
p5 + p6 + p7 + p8 = 1,
p9 + p10 + p11 + p12 = 1,
p13 + p14 + p15 + p16 = 1.
(41)
Notice that the factorizable probabilities (12) are also normalized and (41) holds for them.
Payoff relations (13) are originally constructed when the game given by the matrices (9) is
played with four coins and their mathematical form convinces one to use the following recipe [24]
to reward players when the same game is played using EPR probabilities (40):
ΠA(S1, S
′
1) = Kp1 + Lp2 +Mp3 +Np4,
ΠA(S1, S
′
2) = Kp5 + Lp6 +Mp7 +Np8,
ΠA(S2, S
′
1) = Kp9 + Lp10 +Mp11 +Np12,
ΠA(S2, S
′
2) = Kp13 + Lp14 +Mp15 +Np16.
(42)
Here ΠA(S1, S
′
2), for example, is Alice’s payoff when she plays S1 and Bob plays S
′
2. Like it is the
case with four coins, the payoff relations for Bob are obtained from (42) by the transformation
L⇆M in Eqs. (42).
When pi are factorizable in terms of r, r
′, s, s′, a comparison of (42) with (13) requires
p1 = rr
′, p2 = r(1 − r′), p3 = r′(1− r), p4 = (1− r)(1 − r′),
p5 = rs
′, p6 = r(1 − s′), p7 = s′(1− r), p8 = (1− r)(1 − s′),
p9 = sr
′, p10 = s(1− r′), p11 = r′(1− s), p12 = (1− s)(1 − r′),
p13 = ss
′, p14 = s(1− s′), p15 = s′(1− s), p16 = (1− s)(1 − s′).
(43)
That is, the factorizability of pi in terms r, r
′, s, s′ makes the game played by EPR probabilities
equivalent to the one played by using coins.
However, the EPR probabilities pi, appearing in (13), may not be factorizable in terms of
r, s, r′, s′, whereas for both the payoff relations (13, 42) the normalization (41) continues to hold.
5 Two-player games using non-factorizable probabilities
As it is the case with the coin game, Alice’s mixed strategy is defined to be the probability to
choose between S1 and S2 and we can use, once again, the payoff relations (15) which, however,
now correspond to the possible situation when pi may not be factorizable. So that, the relations
(13) can be replaced with the relations (42) in Alice’s mixed-strategy payoff relation in (15). The
same applies to Bob’s payoff relations.
Note that when pi are factorizable, using (43) allows the probabilities r, r
′, s, s′ to be expressed
in terms of pi:
r = p1 + p2, s = p9 + p10, r
′ = p1 + p3, s
′ = p5 + p7, (44)
which are useful relations for the forthcoming argument for a quantum game.
Along with the normalization (41), the EPR probabilities pi (1 ≤ i ≤ 16) also satisfy certain
other constraints imposed by the requirements of causality. Cereceda [26] writes these constraints
as
p1 + p2 − p5 − p6 = 0, p1 + p3 − p9 − p11 = 0,
p9 + p10 − p13 − p14 = 0, p5 + p7 − p13 − p15 = 0,
p3 + p4 − p7 − p8 = 0, p11 + p12 − p15 − p16 = 0,
p2 + p4 − p10 − p12 = 0, p6 + p8 − p14 − p16 = 0,
(45)
which is referred to as the causal communication constraint [26]. Notice that the constraints
(45), of course, also hold when pi are factorizable and are written in terms of r, s, r
′, s′ as in
(43). Essentially, these constraints state that, on measurement, Alice’s probability of obtaining
particular outcome (+1 or −1), when she goes for S1 or S2, is independent of how Bob sets
up his apparatus (i.e. along S′1 or along S
′
2). The same applies to Bob i.e. on measurement his
probability of obtaining a particular outcome (+1 or −1), when he goes for S′1 or S′2, is independent
of how Alice sets up her apparatus (i.e. along S1 or along S2). Other authors may like to call the
constraints (45) with some different name, for example, Winsberg and Fine [22] have described
them as the locality constraint.
Notice that because of normalization (41) half of the Eqs. (45) are redundant that makes eight
among sixteen probabilities pi to be independent. A convenient solution [26] of the system (41,
45), for which the set of variables:
υ = {p2, p3, p6, p7, p10, p11, p13, p16} , (46)
is expressed in terms of the remaining set of variables:
µ = {p1, p4, p5, p8, p9, p12, p14, p15} , (47)
is given as follows
p2 = (1− p1 − p4 + p5 − p8 − p9 + p12 + p14 − p15)/2,
p3 = (1− p1 − p4 − p5 + p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 + p15)/2,
p6 = (1 + p1 − p4 − p5 − p8 − p9 + p12 + p14 − p15)/2,
p7 = (1− p1 + p4 − p5 − p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 + p15)/2,
p10 = (1− p1 + p4 + p5 − p8 − p9 − p12 + p14 − p15)/2,
p11 = (1 + p1 − p4 − p5 + p8 − p9 − p12 − p14 + p15)/2,
p13 = (1− p1 + p4 + p5 − p8 + p9 − p12 − p14 − p15)/2,
p16 = (1 + p1 − p4 − p5 + p8 − p9 + p12 − p14 − p15)/2.
(48)
The relationships (48) between joint probabilities arise because both the normalization condition
(41) and the causal communication constraint (45) are fulfilled.
From Eqs. (48) one can obtain other constraints considering that the sum of any combination
of probabilities from the set υ must be non-negative. In the following are some results to be used
later in this paper. In (48) the sum p2 + p7 is non-negative and it requires that
p1 + p8 ≤ 1. (49)
In (48) the sum p3 + p10 is non-negative and it requires that
p1 + p12 ≤ 1. (50)
Similarly, the sum p6 + p13 is non-negative and it requires that
p8 + p13 ≤ 1. (51)
Both of the inequalities (49, 50) are found useful in developing a quantum version of PD. The
inequality (51) is found useful in developing quantum version of SH.
Using (42) in (15), with the assumption that (x⋆, y⋆) is a NE, one obtains
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (x⋆ − x)[y⋆ {KΩ1 + LΩ2 +MΩ3 +NΩ4}+
{K (p5 − p13) + L (p6 − p14) +M (p7 − p15) +N (p8 − p16)}] ≥ 0, (52)
and
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (y⋆ − y)[x⋆ {KΩ1 +MΩ2 + LΩ3 +NΩ4}+
{K (p9 − p13) +M (p10 − p14) + L (p11 − p15) +N (p12 − p16)}] ≥ 0, (53)
where
Ω1 = p1 − p5 − p9 + p13, Ω2 = p2 − p6 − p10 + p14,
Ω3 = p3 − p7 − p11 + p15, Ω4 = p4 − p8 − p12 + p16. (54)
Now use (48) to write (52) and (53) in terms of the probabilities appearing in the set µ given in
(47) to obtain
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (1/2)(x⋆ − x)[y⋆△3×
(1 + p1 + p4 − p5 − p8 − p9 − p12 − p14 − p15)−
{△3(1− p5 − p8 − p14 − p15)+
(△1 +△2)(p1 − p4 − p9 + p12)}] ≥ 0,
(55)
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (1/2)(y⋆ − y)[x⋆△3×
(1 + p1 + p4 − p5 − p8 − p9 − p12 − p14 − p15)−
{△3(1− p9 − p12 − p14 − p15)+
(△1 +△2)(p1 − p4 − p5 + p8)}] ≥ 0.
(56)
Notice that the probabilities associated to the EPR experiments can be factorized only for certain
directions of measurements even for singlet states. For these directions the game played using
EPR experiments can thus be interpreted within the four-coin setup.
Essentially, we obtain quantum game from the classical as follows. Referring to the four-coin
setup developed in the Section 3, the factorizability of associated probabilities in terms of r, s, r′, s′
allows us to translate the requirement that the resulting game has a classical interpretation into
certain constraints on r, s, r′, s′. We find that from factorizability the relations (44) follow and
from these relations the constraints on r, s, r′, s′ can be re-expressed in terms of pi (1 ≤ i ≤ 16).
We now obtain a quantum version of the game by retaining these constraints and afterwards
allowing pi to become non-factorizable. In this procedure retaining the constraints ensures that
classical outcome results when probabilities become factorizable.
5.1 Examples
In the following we consider the impact of non-factorizable probabilities on the NE in PD, SH,
and the Chicken game.
5.1.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
Recall that Section 3 states the result that when PD is played with four coins we require the
condition (19) to hold if the strategy pair (S2, S
′
2) is to exist as a NE. Along with this the
probabilities pi are to be factorizable.
This motivates to construct a quantum version of PD when probabilities pi are not factoriz-
able while the constraint (19) remains valid. The condition (19) ensures that with factorizable
probabilities the game can be interpreted classically.
Notice that when the probabilities pi are factorizable, i.e. they can be written as in (43), the
constraint (19) can hold when numerical values are assigned to certain probabilities among pi:
p5 = 0, p7 = 0, p9 = 0, p10 = 0, p16 = 1, (57)
where, because of the normalization (41), p16 = 1 requires that p13 = 0, p14 = 0, and p15 = 0.
This can also be noticed more directly from (44). This assignment of values to certain probabilities
reduces Eqs. (41) and Eqs. (45) to
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1,
p1 + p2 = p6, p1 + p3 = p11,
p3 + p4 = p8, p11 + p12 = 1,
p2 + p4 = p12, p6 + p8 = 1.
(58)
Substituting from (57) into (55, 56) gives
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆)
= (1/2)(x⋆ − x)[y⋆△3(1 + p1 + p4 − p8 − p12)−
{△3(1− p8) + (△1 +△2)(p1 − p4 + p12)}] ≥ 0;
(59)
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y)
= (1/2)(y⋆ − y)[x⋆△3(1 + p1 + p4 − p8 − p12)−
{△3(1− p12) + (△1 +△2)(p1 − p4 + p8)}] ≥ 0.
(60)
Note that from (58) we obtain (1 − p8) = p6 = p1 + p2, that for factorizable probabilities,
becomes equal to r when we refer to Eqs. (44). Similarly, from (58) we obtain (p1 − p4 +
p12) = p1 + p2 = r. Substituting these in (59) along with that x
⋆ = 0 = y⋆ gives ΠA(0, 0) −
ΠA(x, 0) = xr△2 ≥ 0. In similar way we find from (58) that (1 − p12) = p11 = p1 + p3 which
for factorizable probabilities becomes equal to r′ when we use Eqs. (44). Likewise, from (58) we
obtain (p1−p4+p8) = p1+p3 = r′. Substituting these in (60), along with that x⋆ = 0 = y⋆, gives
ΠB(0, 0)−ΠB(0, y) = yr′△2 ≥ 0. This can be described as follows: When probabilities p1, p4, p8
and p12 are factorizable and the values assigned to them in (57) hold, the inequalities (59, 60)
ensure that the strategy pair (S2, S
′
2) becomes a NE.
Now we ask about the fate of the NE strategy pair (S2, S
′
2) when in (57) the values assigned to
certain probabilities, resulting from the requirement (19), hold while pi do not remain factorizable
in terms of r, s, r′, s′. Allow the probabilities p1, p4, p8 and p12 not to be factorizable and use (57)
in (48) to get 1− p1 + p4 − p8 − p12 = 0 and the inequalities (59, 60) take the form:
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆)
= (x⋆ − x) [△2 {y⋆ − (1− p8)/p1} −△1y⋆] p1 ≥ 0, (61)
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y)
= (y⋆ − y) [△2 {x⋆ − (1 − p12)/p1} −△1x⋆] p1 ≥ 0, (62)
where △1 and △2 are defined in the Section (3.2.1). Note that (49) and (50) give 1 ≤ (1− p8)/p1
and 1 ≤ (1− p12)/p1 so that
{y⋆ − (1 − p8)/p1} ≤ 0, {x⋆ − (1 − p12)/p1} ≤ 0, (63)
which results, once again, in the strategy pair (x⋆, y⋆) = (0, 0) being a NE, which is the classical
outcome of the game.
Notice that this NE emerges for non-factorizable EPR probabilities along with our requirement
that factorizable probabilities must lead to the classical game. This result for PD appears to
diverge away from the reported results in quantum games [2]. We believe that part of the reason
resides with how payoff relations and players’ strategies are defined in the present framework,
which exploits EPR setup for playing a quantum game.
5.1.2 Stag Hunt
Section 3.2.2 describes playing SH in the four-coin setup for which three NE emerge. For each
of these three NE there correspond constraints on r, s, r′, s′ for factorizable probabilities. In the
following we first translate these constraints in terms of the EPR probabilities pi and afterwards
allow pi to assume non-factorizable values when the constraints on r, s, r
′, s′, expressed in terms of
pi, continue to hold. In the following we follow this procedure for each individual NE that arises
when SH is played in the four-coin setup.
(x⋆, y⋆)1 = (0, 0) : Refer to Eqs. (23) in Section 3.2.2 and consider the NE (x
⋆, y⋆)1 = (0, 0) for
which the constraint on probabilities are (19) as it is the case with PD. Analysis for quantum PD
from Section 5.1.1, therefore, remains valid and we can directly use the inequalities (61, 62, 63)
to obtain
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (x⋆ − x) {y⋆△3 −△2(1− p8)/p1} p1 ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (y⋆ − y) {x⋆△3 −△2(1− p12)/p1} p1 ≥ 0, (64)
where △3 > △2 > 0. This gives rise to three equilibria:
(x⋆, y⋆)Qa1 = (0, 0);
(x⋆)Qa2 = (△2/△3)(1 − p12)/p1, (y⋆)Qa2 = (△2/△3)(1− p8)/p1;
(x⋆, y⋆)Qa3 = (1, 1);
(65)
where the superscript Q refers to ‘quantum’. From the relations (64, 65) and the inequalities
(49, 50) it turns out that (x⋆, y⋆)Qa1 emerges without any further constraints apart from the ones
given by re-expressed form of (19) i.e. (57);
{
(x⋆)Qa2 , (y
⋆)Qa2
}
emerges when non-factorizable
probabilities are such that, apart from (57) to hold, both (△2/△3)(1− p12)/p1 and (△2/△3)(1−
p8)/p1 have values in the interval [0, 1]; and (x
⋆, y⋆)Qa3 emerges when, apart from (57) being true,
both {△3 −△2(1− p8)/p1} and {△3 −△2(1− p12)/p1} are non negative.
(x⋆, y⋆)2 = (△2/△3,△2/△3) : Refer to Section 3.2.2 and use (44) and (45), along with the
normalization (41), to express the constraints (28) as
p1 = 1 = p6 and p11 = 1 = p16. (66)
The normalization (41), then, assigns zero value to the remaining 12 probabilities. Now substitute
the constraints (66) in Eqs. (55, 56) to obtain the NE inequalities that will correspond to the
non-factorizable probabilities:
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (x⋆ − x)[y⋆△3 −△2] ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (y⋆ − y)[x⋆△3 −△2] ≥ 0. (67)
This results in identical to the classical situation and the three NE:
(x⋆, y⋆)Qb1 = (0, 0);
(x⋆, y⋆)Qb2 = (△2/△3,△2/△3);
(x⋆, y⋆)Qb3 = (1, 1);
(68)
emerge when (66) hold.
(x⋆, y⋆)3 = (1, 1) : For this NE in (23) the constraint on probabilities are (27) i.e. r = 0 = r
′.
For factorizable probabilities, this constraint can be rewritten using normalization (41) along with
(44, 45) as
p5 = 0, p6 = 0, p9 = 0, p11 = 0,
p7 + p8 = 1 = p10 + p12, p4 = 1,
(69)
from which using the normalization (41) it then follows that p1 = 0, p2 = 0, p3 = 0. The
constraints (69) reduce the Nash inequalities (55, 56) to
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆)
= (1/2)(x⋆ − x)[y⋆△3(2− p8 − p12 − p14 − p15)−
{△3(1− p8 − p14 − p15) + (△1 +△2)(−1 + p12)}] ≥ 0;
(70)
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y)
= (1/2)(y⋆ − y)[x⋆△3(2− p8 − p12 − p14 − p15)−
{△3(1− p12 − p14 − p15) + (△1 +△2)(−1 + p8)}] ≥ 0.
(71)
Using the constraints (69) in the 7-th Equation in (48) results in p13 = (2−p8−p12−p14−p15)/2
which then simplifies the Nash inequalities (70, 71) to
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (x⋆ − x) {−(1− y⋆)p13△3 + (1− p12)△2} ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (y⋆ − y) {−(1− x⋆)p13△3 + (1− p8 − p13)△2} ≥ 0, (72)
and gives rise to three NE that are described below.
(x
⋆
, y
⋆)
Qc
1 : For this NE we have (x
⋆, y⋆)Qc1 = (0, 0) and the inequalities (72) become
ΠA(0, 0)−ΠA(x, 0) = xp13△3 {1− (△2/△3)(1− p12)/p13} ≥ 0,
ΠB(0, 0)−ΠB(0, y) = yp13△3 {1− (△2/△3)(1 − p8 − p13)/p13} ≥ 0, (73)
where from (50, 51) we have (1− p12) ≥ 0 and (1− p8 − p13) ≥ 0. That is, (x⋆, y⋆)Qc1 = (0, 0) will
be a NE when p8, p12, and p13 are such that
1 ≥ (△2/△3)(1− p12)/p13, 1 ≥ (△2/△3)(1 − p8 − p13)/p13, (74)
hold true along with the constraints (69).
(x⋆, y⋆)Qc2 : From the inequalities (72) the strategy pair (x
⋆, y⋆)Qc2 = (x
⋆, y⋆) where the
strategy pair x⋆ = 1− (△2/△3)(1 − p8 − p13)/p13, y⋆ = 1− (△2/△3)(1− p12)/p13 can exist as a
NE when p8, p12, and p13 are such that x
⋆, y⋆ ∈ [0, 1]. Together with this the constraints (69) are
to hold.
(x
⋆
, y
⋆)
Qc
3 : For the possible NE (x
⋆, y⋆)Qc3 = (1, 1) the inequalities (72) become
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (1 − x)(1 − p12)△2 ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (1− y)(1− p8 − p13)△2 ≥ 0, (75)
which are to hold along with that the constraints (69) being true. Using △1,△1 > 0 with (50, 51)
we find that the inequalities (75) will always hold and the only requirement for the strategy pair
(x⋆, y⋆)Qc3 = (1, 1) to be a NE is that the constraints (69) hold.
So that the list of possible NE, that can arise in the quantum SH, consists of five members i.e.
(0, 0), (1, 1), {△2(1 − p12)/△3p1, △2(1 − p8)/△3p1}, (△2/△3, △2/△3), and [{1 − △2(1 − p8 −
p13)/△3p13}, {1 − △2(1 − p12)/△3p13}]. Which one, or more, from this list are going to arise
depends on the set of non-factorizable probabilities. For example, we notice that there exist [26]
two sets of non-factorizable probabilities that maximally violate the quantum prediction of the
Clauser-Holt-Shimony-Horne (CHSH) sum of correlations. The first set is
pj = (2 +
√
2)/8 for all pj ∈ µ,
pk = (2−
√
2)/8 for all pk ∈ υ, (76)
and the second set is
pj = (2−
√
2)/8 for all pj ∈ µ,
pk = (2 +
√
2)/8 for all pk ∈ υ, (77)
where µ and υ are defined in (46) and in (47), respectively. The probabilities in these sets are
non-factorizable because for both sets a solution of the Eqs. (43) will involve one or more of
the probabilities r, s, r′, s′ being negative or greater than one. Now for SH the requirement that
factorizable probabilities are to lead to classical game gives rise to three sets of constraints on
EPR probabilities given by (57), (66), and (69). These sets of constraints correspond to the NE
(x⋆, y⋆)1 = (0, 0), (x
⋆, y⋆)2 = (△2/△3,△2/△3), and (x⋆, y⋆)3 = (1, 1) respectively. Unfortunately,
the probabilities from either of the two sets (76, 77), which maximally violate the quantum pre-
diction of the CHSH sum of correlations, do not satisfy these constraints. Stated otherwise, the
probabilities from the sets (76, 77) are in conflict with the requirement that factorizable probabil-
ities must lead to the classical game of SH. However, other sets of non-factorizable probabilities
can be found that are consistent with this requirement and, depending on the elements of a set,
one or more out of five possible NE may emerge. This situation can be described by saying that
in SH non-factorizability can lead to new NE but, unfortunately, either of the sets (76, 77) cannot
be used for this purpose.
5.1.3 Chicken game
Refer to Section 3.2.3 and use Eqs. (36) express the constraints on r, s, r′, s′ in this setup. These
constraints are imposed for the strategy pair x⋆ = α/(α + β) = y⋆ is to be a NE. Use Eqs. (44)
and the normalization (41) to translate these constraints in terms of the EPR probabilities pi:
α(p2 + p4) = β(p5 + p7), (78)
α(p3 + p4) = β(p9 + p10). (79)
Addition and subtraction of (79) to and from (78) gives
α(p2 + p3 + 2p4) = β(p5 + p7 + p9 + p10),
α(p2 − p3) = β(p5 + p7 − p9 − p10), (80)
and Eqs. (48) then allow us to re-express Eqs. (80) in terms of the probabilities in set µ, defined
in (47), to obtain
(α/β − 1)(1− p1 + p4) = p5 − p8 + p9 − p12,
(1 + β/α)(−p14 + p15) = p5 − p8 − p9 + p12. (81)
Two probabilities can be eliminated from the inequalities (55, 56) using Eqs. (81). We select
(arbitrarily) these to be p12 and p15 and express them in terms of other probabilities in the set µ
i.e.
p12 = p5 − p8 + p9 − (α/β − 1)(1− p1 + p4),
p15 = p14 +
2(p5−p8)−(α/β−1)(1−p1+p4)
1+β/α .
(82)
Notice that for the Chicken game, defined in (29), the definition of △1,2 in Section 3.2.1 gives
△1 = β, △2 = −α. (83)
Now eliminate p12 and p15 from the inequalities (55, 56) using Eqs. (82) and substitute from Eqs.
(83). The inequalities (55, 56) then read
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆)
= α(x⋆ − x)[−y⋆{(p1 − 2p5 − p9 − p14 + p8)+
(1 − p1 + p4)α/β + (p1 − p5 − p9 − p14)β/α}+
{(1− p5 − p14)− (p5 + p14)β/α}];
(84)
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y)
= α(y⋆ − y)[−x⋆{(p1 − 2p5 − p9 − p14 + p8)+
(1 − p1 + p4)α/β + (p1 − p5 − p9 − p14)β/α}+
{(p1 − p4 − 2p5 + 2p8 − p9 − p14)+
(1 − p1 + p4)α/β − (p9 + p14)β/α}].
(85)
Inequalities (84, 85) ensure that for factorizable probabilities the classical NE x⋆ = α/(α+β) =
y⋆ comes out as the outcome of the game. What is the fate of this equilibrium when probabilities
are not factorizable? To address this question we consider a special case when α = β, for which
x⋆ = 1/2 = y⋆ is the classical mixed-strategy outcome of the game. To obtain this outcome within
the four-coin setup the constraints on r, s, r′, s′ are given in Eqs. (38). The inequalities (84, 85)
reduce to
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆)
= α(x⋆ − x){−y⋆(1 + p1 + p4 − 3p5 + p8 − 2p9 − 2p14)+
(1 − 2p5 − 2p14)};
(86)
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y)
= α(y⋆ − y){−x⋆(1 + p1 + p4 − 3p5 + p8 − 2p9 − 2p14)+
(1 − 2p5 + 2p8 − 2p9 − 2p14)}.
(87)
Notice that the inequalities (72) do not allow either of the strategy pairs (x⋆, y⋆) = (1, 0) and
(x⋆, y⋆) = (0, 1) to be NE. Like it has been the case with quantum SH, we now ask which of these
nine possible NE will emerge when probabilities become non-factorizable. To answer this we refer
to the set (76) of probabilities and assign the value (2 +
√
2)/8 to each of the probabilities p1, p4,
p5, p8, p9, p14. Using Eqs. (82) the assumption that α = β then also assigns the same value, i.e.
(2 +
√
2)/8, to both p12 and p15. The inequalities (86, 87) are
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = (α/
√
2)(x⋆ − x)(y⋆ − 1) ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = (α/
√
2)(y⋆ − y)(x⋆ − 1) ≥ 0, (88)
with the result that the strategy pairs (x⋆, y⋆) = (1, 1), (0, 0) emerge as the new equilibria3. So
that, in this case, the set (76) of non-factorizable probabilities indeed leads to the new equilibria
of the game. Using (15) one finds that at the equilibrium (1, 1) both players get α(2−√2)/4 while
at (0, 0) both players get α(2 +
√
2)/4 as their payoffs.
Note that, when re-expressed in terms of the EPR probabilities pi using Eqs. (44), the con-
straints (38) can be written as
p1 + p2 + p9 + p10 = 1 = p1 + p3 + p5 + p7, (89)
which, of course, continue to hold for the set (76) when the probabilities pi are allowed to be
non-factorizable.
Similarly, referring to the second set (77), we assign the value (2 −√2)/8 to the probabilities
p1, p4, p5, p8, p9, p14 that appear in (86) and (87). The Eqs. (82), with the assumption that
α = β, then assign the value of (2−√2)/8 both to p12 and p15 and the inequalities (86, 87) read
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠA(x, y⋆) = −(α/
√
2)(x⋆ − x)(y⋆ − 1) ≥ 0,
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)−ΠB(x⋆, y) = −(α/
√
2)(y⋆ − y)(x⋆ − 1) ≥ 0, (90)
which are the same as the ones given in (88), apart from extra negative signs. This results in three
strategy pairs (x⋆, y⋆) = (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1) to come out as the equilibria. Once again, using (15)
one finds that at all of these three equilibria both players get equally rewarded by the amount
α(2 +
√
2)/4. Hence, while referring to (31), we find that in this special case when α = β the set
(77) of probabilities leads to new equilibria of the game. Notice that, like it is the case with the
set (76) of probabilities, the constraints (89) continue to hold also for the set (77) when pi are
allowed to be non-factorizable.
6 Discussion
In typical quantization procedure [2, 5] of a two-player game, two quantum bits (qubits) are in
a quantum correlated (entangled) state that are given to the players Alice and Bob. Players’
strategies consist of performing unitary actions on their respective qubits. Classical game remains
a subset of the quantum game in that both players can play quantum strategies that correspond
to the strategies available classically.
As more choices are allowed to the players that now also include superpositions of their classical
moves, it gives ground to the argument4 that Enk and Pike [27] have put forward. The setup
3Referring to (31) we recall that when α = β there are three equilibria i.e. (1, 0), (0, 1) and (1/2, 1/2) in the
classical Chicken game, at which they get rewarded by (α, β), (β, α) and (αβ/(α + β), αβ/(α + β)), respectively.
Here the first and the second entry refers to Alice’s and Bob’s reward, respectively.
4Enk and Pike [27] argument can be described as follows. The extended set of players’ moves allows us to
construct an extended payoff matrix that includes extra available moves. Enk and Pike interpret this by saying
that the ‘essence’ of a quantized game can be captured by a different classical game and it is the new game that is
constructed and solved and not the original classical game.
proposed in this paper uses EPR experiments to play a two-player game and a quantum game
is associated to a classical game such that it becomes hard to construct an Enk and Pike-type
argument as both the payoff relations and the players’ sets of strategies remain identical [28] in
the classical and the associated quantum game.
In the present setup it is non-factorizability – responsible for the violation of Bell inequality
in EPR experiments – that gives rise to the new solutions in quantum game. When players play
a game using a physical system for which joint probabilities are factorizable the classical game
results always. In other words, the role of non-factorizable probabilities is sought in the game-
theoretic solution concept of a NE, when the physical realization for these probabilities is provided
by the EPR experiments. This analysis introduces a new viewpoint in the area of quantum games
in which non-factorizability gets translated into the language of game theory.
The argument put forward in this paper can be described as follows. Firstly, players’ payoffs
are re-expressed in the form ΠA,B(pi, x, y,A,B) where pi are the sixteen joint probabilities; x, y are
players strategies, and A,B are players’ payoff matrices defined in (9). Secondly, Nash inequalities
are used to impose constraints on pi that ensure that with factorizable pi the game has classical
outcome and the resulting payoffs can be interpreted in terms of classical mixed-strategy game.
It is achieved by playing the game in the four-coin setup and using Nash inequalities to obtain
constraints on the coin probabilities r, s, r′, s′ which reproduce the outcome of the classical mixed-
strategy game. Using (44), which results from factorizability, these constraints on r, s, r′, s′ are
then translated in terms of constraints on pi. Thirdly, while referring to the EPR setup, pi are
allowed to be non-factorizable when the constraints on pi continue to hold. Fourthly, and lastly,
it is observed how non-factorizability leads to the emergence of new solutions of the game.
Note that for a game different sets of constraints are defined depending on which NE is to be
the solution of the game. For example, for three NE in Chicken we require three different sets of
constraints on r, s, r′, s′. Considering one of these three sets at a time we repeat the four steps
stated above. The same procedure is then repeated for other sets of constraints corresponding to
other NE.
That is, in this setup not all solutions of a game are re-expressed in terms of a single set of
constraints on r, s, r′, s′. Instead, a separate set of constraints is found for each NE. It seems that
the four-coin setup is the minimal arrangement that allows one to introduce, in a smooth way, the
EPR probabilities into a game-like setting. We suggest that with increasing the number of coins,
shared by each of the two players, all the NE of a game can be translated to a single constraint on
the underlying coin probabilities which are subsequently translated in terms of pi. This will then
allow to see the role of non-factorizability on solution of a game from a single set of constraints.
However, this will be obtained at a price: Firstly, more coins will be involved resulting in more
mathematical complexity; secondly, for more coins player’s strategy will need to be redefined such
that it permits to incorporate EPR probabilities.
Note that the usual approach uses entangled states to construct quantum games and this
paper uses non-factorizability to the same end. Mathematically, non-factorizability comes out to
be a stronger condition than the condition that translates entanglement into constraints on joint
probabilities. That is, a non-factorizable set of probabilities always corresponds to some entangled
state but an entangled state can produce a factorizable set of probabilities. For example, in
case of singlet state the outcomes of two measurements violate Bell inequality only along certain
directions, and not along other directions. In other words, in a quantum game exploiting entangled
states, the joint probabilities may still be factorizable but for a quantum game, resulting from
non-factorizable probabilities, Bell inequality is bound to be violated. Non-factorizability being a
stronger condition may well be suggested as the reason why it cannot be helpful to escape from
the classical outcome in PD.
The proposed setup demonstrates how non-factorizability can change outcome of a game. We
suggest to extend [29] this setup to analyze multi-player quantum games [3] where players share
physical systems for which joint probabilities cannot be factorized.
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